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WARTH v. SELDIN:
THE SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY TEST
By DonnaPetreStyne* and CatherineMiller Van Aken**

Introduction
Zoning ordinances were originally an outgrowth of nuisance law
and, as such, regarded as peculiarly local in nature.1 Traditionally,
challenges to these ordinances or their administration were brought in
state forums where rigid standing requirements for land use cases assured the strictly intra-community character of such suits. Under generally accepted state standing requirements prospective residents, as
well as nonresidents owning land contiguous with that affected by the
ordinance, have been denied recourse to the judiciary. Even residents
of the community have been precluded unless they have made a personal request for relief that was denied by the zoning board.2
In recent years, however, commentators have discovered a constitutional dimension to the land use ordinance.3 They point out that cerMember, third year class.
Member, third year class.
1. Ayer, The PrimitiveLaw of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes From
a Dark Continent, 55 IowA L. Rzv. 344 (1969).
2. Most states have adopted the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which provides standing for judicial review to any "person aggrieved" by a decision of an administrative officer relating to a zoning ordinance. The majority of courts construing "person aggrieved" have applied a strict property interest requirement. Thus a landowner,
tenant, contract vendor, contract vendee, mortgagee and mortgagor all would have standing if a zoning board denied their requested relief. On the other hand, prospective
homeowners and tenants, optionees and homeowner's associations would be denied access
to the courts. Under state standing law, nonresidents are barred from challenging land
use decisions in another municipality. This barrier exists in the majority of cases even
when a nonresident owns property outside the municipality that is contiguous with the
*

**

land subject to the zoning decision.

See 3 R. AlNDRsoN, AMEmcAN LAW OF ZONING,

§§ 21.05 -.12 (1968); 2 A. RATHKOPF, Tnn LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, ch. 40 (3d
ed. 1972); Note, The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 Wm. & MARY L.
REv. 294 (1967); Comment, Standing to Appeal Zoning Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 Mscn. L. REv. 1070 (1966).
3. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L REv. 767 (1969); Note, Low-Income Housing and the Equal
Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and
Equal Protection, 84 .HARv. L REv. 1645 (1971); Note, Segregation and the Suburbs:
Low-Income Housing, Zoning, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 IowA L. Rnv. 1298
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tain land use ordinances may have an exclusionary impact upon minorities4 in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Aggrieved minority individuals excluded from the com-

munity by an allegedly unconstitutional ordinance could not satisfy state
standing requirements. Consequently, they sought relief from a federal forum.

This choice of a federal forum would have been illusive

but for the simultaneous changes taking place in the federal law of
standing.' The "legal injury" test6 which had governed standing in the
(1971); Comment, The Equal ProtectionClause: A Single-edged Sword for the Gordian
Knot of Exclusionary Zoning, 40 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 24 (1971).
4. Many different types of exclusionary land use ordinances have been reviewed
by the courts. Minimum residential lot sizes were invalidated in Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (zoning ordinance for two or three
acres); but upheld in Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974)
(large minimum lot size zoning ordinance); County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County
v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967) (five acre minimum lot size). Minimum
building size requirements were upheld in Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Township, 13 NJ.
Super. 490, 80 A.2d 650 (L. Div. 1951), rev'd, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal
dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (per curiam) (minimum floor area requirements); but
invalidated in Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954) (minimum floor
area requirement of 1800 square feet). Exclusion of mobile homes has been allowed in
Vickers v. Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371
U.S. 233 (1963) (zoning ordinance barring trailer camps from industrial district); Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851
(1971) (exclusion of mobile homes from residential areas). Exclusion of multiple unit
dwellings was disallowed in Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). Restrictions on the number of bedrooms per dwelling unit were invalidated in Oakwood
at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div.
1971); but upheld in Malmar Associates v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince
George's County, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971) (percentage of bedrooms in apartment developments in medium density district).
Much has been written about exclusionary land use devices. Among the most informative discussions is 3 N. WILLAmS, AMERCAN AND PLANNING Lmv pt. 8, § D
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WILLiAmS]. Professor Williams points out that exclusionary land use devices are usually not motivated solely by a desire to discriminate. Bona
fide purposes such as preservation of aesthetics, a rural atmosphere, or topographical characteristics may encourage their adoption. Justice Douglas in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), impliedly sanctioned certain motives as legitimate when he stated that "[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs." Id. at 9.
5. Most authors who undertake an analysis of any facet of the law of standing
preface their work with epithetical warnings. Resisting the temptation, we will simply
note the constitutional origin of the doctrine in U.S. CoNsT. art. MI, § 2, cl. 1. "The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, . . to
all Cases of admiralty . .. to Controversies between two or more States . . ." (emphasis added).
This clause has always been cited as the foundation for the standing doctrine. The
meaning attached to the terms "cases" and "controversies" determines the extent of judi-
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federal courts for fifty years would have required a property interest

in any case involving land use. With the abandonment of the "legal
injury" test in 1970 in Association of Data ProcessingService Organiza-

tions, Inc. v. Camp,7 and the substitution of the "injury in fact" test,

cial power. Adverse litigants with truly conflicting interests represent the standard
stressed in numerous cases. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court posed
the fundamental question which must be answered in determining whether a litigant has
standing to sue: "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions?" Id. at 204. During the last decade, however, the very nature of
the standing doctrine has been questioned. See, e.g., Bledsoe, Mootness and Standing
in Class Actions, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 430 (1973); Scott, Standing in the Supreme
Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1973). Professor Raoul Berger
goes so far as to doubt the very legitimacy of the doctrine in Berger, Standing to Sue
in Public Actions: Is it a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YAL LJ. 816 (1969). Professor Berger points out that if one is to analyze the true origin of the limiting phrase
"cases or controversies" and discover its meaning, one must look to the English common
law as the lineal ancestor of our own body of law. In doing so he finds that "'standing'
was neither a term of art nor a familiar doctrine at the time the Constitution was
adopted." Id. at 818. At that time, the English practice allowed "one without a 'personal stake' . . . to initiate and maintain an 'adversary' proceeding in the public interest to challenge a jurisdictional usurpation." Id. at 827. Thus, "[w]hen the Court
stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 at 101 (1968), that in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether
the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a
form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolutionL,] . . . [the Court] misinterpreted English history." Id. at 827. Perhaps entertaining doubts concerning Justice
Frankfurter's references to the "practices of the courts of Westminster," the Court
sought to bolster the doctrine of standing by arguments derived from the separation of
powers and advisory opinion doctrines. "The phrase 'cases and controversies' was explained primarily as defining 'the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation
of power to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of the government.'" Id. at 828. This overemphasis on the separation of powers, Berger warns, "is apt to obscure the no less important system of 'checks and balances.'" Id. "'Case or controversy,' to be sure, seeks to confine the courts to what Madison termed cases of a 'judiciary nature' as distinguished from a roving revision of legislation. Legislation is emphatically not for the courts; but after the legislative process
is completed the courts may decide in the frame of litigation that a statute is invalid
as a legislative usurpation. A legislative usurpation does not change character when it
is challenged by a stranger; and judicial restraint thereon remains a 'judicial' function,
not an 'intrusion,' though undertaken at the call of one without a personal stake." Id.
at 829.
6. The "legal injury" test was enunciated in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939), and provided that a persbn threatened with injury by governmental action does not have standing to contest such action in the courts "unless the
right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Id.
at 137-38. Since there is no legal right to be free from competition by the government,
standing was denied in that case.
7. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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the federal courts became the obvious forum for constitutional challenges to local zoning ordinances by nonpropertied low-income minorities.
Though the Data Processing test significantly reduced the threshold requirement for access to the federal courts in general, exactly how
this test would be applied in land use cases was unclear. In the first
generation cases after Data Processing, nonpropertied minorities rais-

ing Fourteenth Amendment challenges to zoning ordinances overcame

the standing barrier. 8 However, in each case, the minorities joined as

co-plaintiff a corporation which had actually perfected an application
for a specific housing project and it was not evident from the decisions
to what extent the individuals' standing was dependent, if at all, upon
this joinder. Nevertheless, this initial success led minority plaintiffs to
attempt more direct attacks on zoning ordinances. Both individually,

and through class actions, prospective purchasers or renters of low or
moderate cost housing and prospective builders of such housing chal-

lenged ordinances on their faces or as enforced without perfecting an
application for a specific housing project. 9 This trend was noted by

commentators," ° several of whom viewed the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in Warth v. Seldin" as an opportunity for the Court to give
its imprimatur to the abandonment of traditional standing rules in land
use cases. The majority of the Court in Warth, however, declined this
opportunity in spite of the liberalization of standing under Data Processing and the important constitutional issues involved in the case. Instead, the Court adopted, a causation test for standing which limits any

future deliberations to the constitutionality of denying a specific variance, thereby precluding any full-scale attack on the system of exclusionary devices.' 2
8. See, e.g., Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th
Cir. 1972); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afrd, 457 F.2d 788
(5th Cir. 1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Sisters of Providence of St. Mary of
Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971); English v. Town of
Huntington, 335 F. Supp. 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); cf. United Farmworkers of Florida
Housing Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. See Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning. The Second Generation Cases and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L. REV. 88 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Aloi].
10. Id.; Note, Towards Liberalized Requirements for Standing in Zoning Litigation-Approximationof the Public Welfare, 5 MEMPmHs ST. U.L. REv. 251 (1975).
11. 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
12. "In holding that neither potential developers nor potential residents of such
housing have standing to make such a claim unless local authorities have rejected a particular proposal for development, the Court has not merely postponed adjudication of
the exclusionary zoning issue. It has eliminated the issue from future litigation. The
effect of requiring a concrete proposal prior to development will be to shift the focus
of subsequent litigation from the issue the plaintiff in Warth wanted to raise-the per-
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The Court's departure from "pure" Data Processing analysis by its
emphasis on the causal element raises questions about the future of the
standing doctrine. The authors contend that such a departure was not
necessary if the Court merely sought to avoid the merits on the particular facts of the Warth case. A review of the relevant case law discloses
ample precedent available to the Court for dismissing the case on the
merits. The fact that the Court did not do so may indicate that the
Court viewed Warth as an opportunity to restrict standing in the land
use area without disrupting the substantial body of law under Data
Processing. Yet the Court's detailed discussion of the causation requirement lends credence to the hypothesis that the Court may intend
to apply Warth even beyond the land use area as part of a wholesale
retreat from the DataProcessingdecision.
Although the Warth complaint names several classes of plaintiffs, 13 we will discuss only the denial of standing to the low-income
missibility of excluding all low- and moderate-cost housing from a suburb-to the quite
different issue of whether rejection of a particular proposal is constitutionally permissible.
The focus, in other words, will be upon the issue so familiar in zoning litigation, whether
the refusal to permit a particular development at a particular location is 'reasonable.'
'The legal significance of the Court's supposedly procedural decisions is, thus, to
foreclose the substantive issue plaintiff attempted to raise. The practical consequence
is to preclude effective use of the federal constitution to open suburbia to additional lowand moderate-cost housing." Sandalow, Comment on Warth v. Seldin, 27 LIAN Usa
LAW & ZONING DiGEST, No. 9, at 7-8 (1975).

13. The class of plaintiffs in Warth included several individual Rochester taxpayers and three associations: Metro-Act of Rochester, Housing Council of Monroe
County, and Rochester Home Builders Association.
The taxpayers owning property in Rochester contended that Penfield's refusal to
provide its "fair share" of low and moderate cost housing had caused an increase in their
tax burden, because the city of Rochester was forced to supply such housing, much of
which was tax-abated. The Court found that apart from the conjectural nature of the
asserted injury, the line of causation between Penfield's action and such injury was not
apparent from the complaint. "Whatever may occur in Penfield, the injury complained
of-increases in taxation-results only from decisions made by the appropriate Rochester authorities, who are not parties to this case." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509
(1975). Even assuming an adequate causal connection, however, the Court found another flaw which alone would have warranted dismissal: plaintiffs did not assert any
personal right under the Constitution or any statute. "In short the claim of these petitioners falls squarely within the prudential standing rule that normally bars litigants
from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief from injury
to themselves." Id. The Court noted exceptions to this general rule:
(1) when Congress, by statute, explicitly allows such third party suits;
(2) when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in an infringement of the third party's rights;
(3) when the challenged activity adversely affects a relationship between the petitioner and the persons whose rights allegedly are violated; and
(4) where the petitioner's prosecution of the suit is necessary to insure protection
of the rights asserted because those actually injured are unable to assert their own rights.
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minority individuals. Our discussion is so limited because they are the
persons who, after Warth, are left largely without a remedy.
This note gives a general background of present standing law, discusses the Warth decision with special emphasis on the newly an-

nounced causation test, and considers possible explanations for the
Court's denial of standing in Warth.
But the Court found none of these exceptions applicable to the petitioner-taxpayers. Id.
at 509-10.
Metro-Act is a nonprofit corporation having as one of its primary purposes the securing of open housing in Rochester suburbs. This organization claimed standing on
its own behalf as a Rochester taxpayer and on behalf of its members who were also
Rochester taxpayers. The Court found that the denial of standing to the Rochester taxpayers was equally applicable to all taxpayer-plaintiffs. Metro-Act also claimed standing on behalf of persons of low and moderate income. For the Court's answer to this
claim, see text accompanying notes 50-57 infra. Relying on Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), Metro-Act alleged that 9% of its members were current residents of Penfield who were deprived, by defendants' exclusionary practices, of the
constitutionally protected benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community. The Court determined that Trafficante was not controlling in the Warth case.
In Trafficante, the plaintiffs had a congressionally conferred right of action under the
1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604. Metro-Act asserted no such statutorily conferred right of action. The Court indicated that even assuming, arguendo, that the asserted harm to Metro-Act's Penfield members was sufficiently direct and personal to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III, prudential considerations would
strongly militate against a grant of standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 512-14.
Housing Council is a nonprofit organization consisting of private and governmental
agencies as well as minorities. Housing Council includes in its membership at least seventeen groups that have been, are, or will be involved in the development of low and
moderate cost housing. But, with the exception of Penfield Better Homes Corporation,
there was no allegation that any of these groups or their members took any steps toward
building in Penfield or had any dealings with the respondents. Consequently, Housing
Council failed to demonstrate any injury to its members of sufficient immediacy and
ripeness to warrant judicial intervention. Id. at 516-17. The Court treated Penfield Better Homes separately in view of the allegations that it had applied to respondents in
late 1969 for a zoning variance to allow the construction of a moderate-cost housing
project and had been rejected. The Court found nothing in the complaint to indicate
that the Better Homes project was still viable in 1972, when this complaint was filed,
or that respondents continued to prevent a then current project. "In short, neither the
complaint nor the record supplies any basis from which to infer that the controversy
between respondents and Better Homes, however vigorous it may once have been, remained a live, concrete dispute when this complaint was filed." Id. at 517.
Home Builders is a nonprofit trade association, consisting of persons in the business
of constructing, developing, and maintaining residential housing in metropolitan Rochester. Home Builders asserted standing to represent its member firms on the grounds that
Penfield's zoning restrictions and the township's refusals to grant permits and variances
for low and moderate cost housing had deprived some of its members of "substantial
business opportunities and profits." Id. at 515. While Home Builders claimed $750,000
in damages, it alleged no monetary injury to itself, nor any assignment of the damage
claims to its members. Since whatever injury that may have been suffered was peculiar
to the individual member concerned, each member would have to be a party to the suit,
and Home Builders would have no standing to claim damages on the member's behalf.
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A.

Requirements for Standing

The Data Processing Test

In 1970, the Supreme Court, with a heightened awareness of its

role in social reform, determined that the "legal injury"'14 requirement
on which standing traditionally had been predicated was unduly restrictive and inappropriate because it necessarily went to the merits. The
thrust of the Court's decision in Data Processingwas to create a standing doctrine which would not compel the anticipatory, sub silentio con-

sideration of substantive issues. 15 A new, two-prong test was advanced
which required that the plaintiff allege (1) that the challenged action
had caused him "injury in fact," economic or otherwise, and (2) that
the interest which he was seeking to protect was arguably within the
zone of interests protected or regulated by statute or constitutional

guarantee.' 6 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, acknowledged
the rule of judicial self-restraint. However, he also emphasized the

trend toward enlarging the class of persons who may protest administrative action to include even those who are not specifically included in
the statutory or constitutional provision, as long as they are not specifi-

cally excluded.' 7 Justices Brennan and White would have gone further in liberalizing the standing doctrine by eliminating the second

prong of the test and requiring simply an allegation of "injury in fact."' 8

Home Builders' prayer for prospective relief failed also. The complaint referred to no
specific project of any of its members that was currently precluded either by the ordinance or by respondents' enforcement thereof. Home Builders and its members suffered no personal and immediate injury. Id. at 514-16.
14. See note 6 supra.
15. "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
16. Id. at 152-53.
17. "Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class
of people who may protest administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging the
category of aggrieved 'persons' is symptomatic of that trend." Id. at 154.
18. "By requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, the Court comes very close to
perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned standing on a showing by the
plaintiff that the challenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected
interests." Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970). See Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cr. L. RFv. 450 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. Professor
Davis agrees with the Brennan-White approach and strongly criticizes the majority view
as being: "(1) analytically faulty, (2) contrary to much case law the Court should not
have intended to overrule, (3) cumbersome, inconvenient, and artificial, and (4) at variance with the dominant intent behind the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 457-58.
But see Sedler, Standing, Justiciability,and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAnD.
L. REv. 479 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sedler]. Professor Sedler finds the appropriateness of the second prong of the Data Processingtest not to be so "live" an issue as Professor Davis suggests. "In the area of judicial review of administrative action, the differ-
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The Data Processing decision was greeted in most quarters with
great relief and applause. 19 Most writers viewed it as an opening of
the Court's doors to new litigation. 20
the standing doctrine: "The Supreme
made the standing obstacle to judicial
self, and have for all practical purposes
ity."

21

Others predicted the demise of
Court's recent decisions have
review a shadow of its former
deprived it of meaningful vital-

B. The Test Refined

Although it was clear that the Court intended to lower the threshold of standing to accommodate all but the most spurious suits, the precise height of that preliminary step was to be measured by subsequent

cases applying the Data Processing yardstick. As the Court began to
employ the new test, it became clear that one vestige of the pre-Data
Processing standing doctrine remained: namely, the party seeking review must claim some personal injury. However, the fact that the
grievance was shared by the multitude did not make it any less appro-

priate as a basis for standing provided it was not a "generalized griev-

ance." 2 A comparison between Sierra Club v. Morton23 and United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures

(SCRAP)2 4 illustrates this distinction.

In Sierra Club a declaratory

ence in approach conceivably could bring about a different result, but only if the courts
would employ the zone of interests test to deny standing to one who has been injured in
fact. In practice they have not done so, and there appears to have been no reported case
in which a court finding injury in fact has not also found that the plaintiff's claim was
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated." Id. at 486.
19. See Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 N.Y.L.F.
911 (1972); Davis, supra note 18. But see Dugan, Standing to Sue: A Commentary
on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256 (1971); Albert, Standing to Challenge
Administrative Action: An InadequateSurrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE LJ. 425
(1974). In Professor Albert's opinion, "[bly de-emphasizing inquiry into the personal
interests of the complainant and granting unexplained relief without inquiry into legal
interest, the Court has indirectly endorsed public interest standing. And in affirming
that standing is or should be a threshold inquiry unconcerned with the merits, and by
rejecting legal interest on that basis, the Court has perpetuated the inappropriate notion
of access standing." Id. at 475-76.
20. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 18, at 481-82. "The practical effect of these decisions . . . is that in most cases standing is no longer an obstacle to judicial action in
federal courts. In policy terms, the new decisions represent a value judgment-and in
this sense a command to lower federal courts-that standing should be liberalized and
federal judicial review of governmental action broadened."
21. National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689,
693 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 687 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SCRAP].
23. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
24. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). It should be noted that Justice Stewart, author of
SCRAP, was the pivotal vote in the five to four decision in Warth.
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judgment and an injunction were sought against the building of a ski
resort in the Mineral King Valley of Sequoia National Forest. The
Court denied standing because the plaintiffs failed to allege personal
injury by neglecting to plead that they were among those who used the
park, and that the projected ski resort would diminish the aesthetic and
recreational value of the area for them. On the other hand, in SCRAP,
the Court was willing to follow a far more attenuated line of causation
to the eventual injury of the plaintiffs. There, the plaintiffs challenged
a proposed rate increase of 2.5 percent on transportation of freight
which allegedly would have caused an increase in the use of nonrecyclable as compared to recyclable commodities. The increased use of
nonrecyclable goods allegedly would have resulted in a need for more
natural resources, some of which might have been taken from the
Washington area, and in the discarding of more refuse in the national
parks in the Washington area. As residents of Washington, the plaintiffs alleged harm to their recreational and aesthetic interests. As taxpayers, they alleged economic harm due to the increased taxes that
would be needed to provide for the disposal of otherwise reusable
waste materials. The Court, finding that these allegations constituted a
claim of personal injury, granted standing. A comparison of these two
cases leads to the conclusion that the test for "injury in fact" was based
not on the directness or significance of the injury, but rather on a simple formality, the proper phrasing of the pleadings.
In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War,25 the
Court again emphasized the need for personal injury, but this time the
requirement was couched in terms of "abstract" and "concrete" injury.
The plaintiffs, suing as citizens, sought a declaration that members of
Congress were ineligible to hold a commission in the armed forces reserve because of the incompatability clause of Article I, section 6. The
plaintiffs alleged that a violation of the incompatability clause would deprive citizens of the faithful discharge of legislative duties by reservist
members of Congress.26 The Court found the allegation abstract and
speculative, and the plaintiffs' interest one that was shared by all citizens.2 7 The Court spoke at length of the necessity for concrete injury:
[C]oncrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form
traditionally capable of judicial resolution. It adds the essential
dimension of specificity to the dispute. . . . This personal stake
is what the Court has consistently held enables a complainant authoritatively to present to a court a complete perspective upon the
25. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
26. Id. at 212.
27. Id. at 220.
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adverse consequences28flowing from the specific set of facts undergirding his grievance.
The Court indicated that the demand for concrete injury was not only
a constitutional requirement, but also a rule of judicial restraint:
To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a
court to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract
would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort
the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and
the Legislature and open the Judiciary
'29 to an arguable charge of
providing "government by injunction.
In O'Shea v. Littleton,3" the Court placed another gloss on the
general requirement of personal injury by requiring that the injury be
"present." Plaintiffs brought a class action to enjoin "discriminatory
enforcement and administration of criminal justice in Alexander County."'" The Court held that past injury, caused by illegal conduct, in
itself did not present a case or controversy "if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects. 3 2 None of the named plaintiffs
alleged a present injury as a result of a statute being unconstitutional
on its face or as applied. Since any future injury rested on a violation of a criminal law, the Court considered such injury too remote to
present an actual case or controversy. The Court assumed that plaintiffs would conduct their activities within the law and thereby avoid
prosecution,
conviction, and exposure to the defendants' allegedly illegal
3
conduct.
This case by case expansion and definition of the term coined in
Data Processing makes it clear that while "injury in fact" may take almost any form, it must nevertheless be a personal, concrete, and present harm. Against this background, Warth occupies a unique position
as the first post-Data Processingstanding decision in the land use area.

II. Warth v. Seldin
A. Background of the Litigation
In 1970, of the 23,782 persons residing in Penfield, New York,
a suburb of Rochester, only sixty were black .4 The community's land
28. Id. at 220-21.
29. Id. at 222.

30. 414 U.S. 488 (1974). The circuit court judge in Warth relied on O'Shea in
denying standing to the plaintiffs.
31. Id. at 491.
32. Id. at 495-96.

33. Id. at 497.
34. This statistic is based on the 1970 census. Petitioners' Brief for the United
States Supreme Court at 8 n.7, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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use ordinance, fairly typical of suburban communities,3 5 allocated

ninety-eight percent of the town's vacant land to single-family detached
housing.36 Only three-tenths of one percent of the land available for
residential construction was zoned for multifamily dwellings, 3 7 with a
maximum density of twelve units per acre, 38 and a minimum number
of garage and enclosed parking facilities for each unit.3 9 In 1972, it

was impossible to construct a single-family dwelling in Penfield conforming to the zoning ordinance at a cost less than $29,115.40

In that

year the plaintiffs brought a class action in the District Court for the
Western District of New York. They challenged Penfield's ordinance
and its administration during a fifteen year period41 by the zoning and
planning boards and the city council as "racially discriminatory and ex-

clusionary.

' 42

In support of this allegation, they claimed that they

searched for housing in Penfield but were excluded due to defendants'
policies and practices and were therefore injured, having been forced

to live in a community with inferior housing 43 and schools, reduced job
opportunities, and increased expense and inconvenience in commuting
long distances to work."
35. This observation was made by Federal Circuit Judge Hays. Warth v. Seldin,
495 F.2d at 1189.
36. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 495 (referring to petitioners' complaint).
37. Id.
38. PENFrELD, N.Y. ORDNANCES §§ 2.9-11.21 D(1)(e).
39. Petitioners' Brief for the United States Supreme Court at 6, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Respondents' Brief for the United States Supreme Court at 1, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
42. Petitioners' Brief for the United States Supreme Court at 3-9, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975). Petitioners alleged the deprivation of rights secured by the First,
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and violation of their rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 4, nn.3 & 4.
43. "'he defects in our apartment include many leaks in the roof, bad wiring,
roach infestation, rat and mice infestation, crumbling housing foundation, broken front
[Slince the foundation has started crumbling,
door, broken hot water heater, etc .....
there have been mice and rats coming into the house. The mice and rat infestation is
now so bad that they come through the heating vents into the rooms of the apartment
itself. I have already caught two mice in the children's bed. To have rats and mice
infesting the house causes great anxiety among the children. One way I try to reduce
the danger of my children getting bitten is to leave the light on in the bedroom all night.
The children are now afraid to go to sleep unless there is a light on in the room.'"
Id. at 10-11.
44. "'The maximum distance from my job if I had been able to live in the Town
of Penfield would have involved driving time of no more than twenty minutes....
Mhe costs of gasoline alone, commuting to and from the job in Penfield has cost me
$666.00 per year."' Id. at 10. "Since I was unable to locate housing near my work
in the Town of Penfield (employment dating from my arriving in Rochester in 1966
to May 1972) I have been forced by reason of the exclusionary practices of the Town
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The district court dismissed the complaint, 4 5 stating that plaintiffs

lacked the requisite standing and had failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

affirmed the lower court on the sole ground that the plaintiffs lacked
standing."
On October 15, 1974, the Supreme Court granted certior7
ari.

4

B. Standing of the Minority Plaintiffs

The minority plaintiffs in Warth alleged that they were excluded
from living in Penfield as a result of the town's racially discriminatory

exclusionary zoning ordinance and its administration by defendants. 8
Each petitioner asserted that he had made fruitless attempts to locate
housing in Penfield that would be within his means and adequate for
his family's needs. Why, despite these allegations of personal, present,
and concrete injury, were plaintiffs denied standing?
The Supreme Court stated at the outset the well-established rule

that for the purpose of testing a motion to dismiss for lack of standing
all allegations are assumed true.49 Accepting plaintiffs' allegations, the

Court did not focus upon a lack of injury in fact or a failure to fall within the zone of interest of the constitutional and statutory framework that
allegedly protected plaintiffs. Rather, the Court articulated a new
question concerning causation.5 0 Did petitioners allege facts from

which it could reasonably be inferred that, absent respondents' restrictive zoning practices, "there [was] a substantial probability that they
would have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield[?]"5 1 This
question, never asked in Data Processing, limits what was formerly
thought to be the Data Processing rule. The Warth decision makes it
of Penfield to reside ... forty-two miles from my work ....
Travel one way to the
job in Penfield took at least one hour and ten minutes one way-in bad weather, the
time involved one way to work was about two hours.'" Id. at 9-10.
45. The district court opinion was unpublished.
46. 495 F.2d at 1189.
47. 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
48. Petitioners' Brief for the United States Supreme Court at 3-9, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).
49. 422 U.S. at 501-02.
50. From the numerous citations in the Warth opinion to prior standing cases one
might deduce that the decision was merely an application of a well-established standing
doctrine. Justice Brennan's dissent shows that he felt that a new test, out of step with
Data Processing, had been established. "The Court today, in an opinion that purports
to be a 'standing' opinion but that actually, I believe, has overtones of outmoded notions
of pleading and of justiciability, refuses to find that any of the variously situated plaintiffs can clear numerous hurdles, some constructed here for the first time, necessary to
establish 'standing'." 422 U.S. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
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clear that not every allegation of injury in fact that falls within the purview of a statute or a constitutional provision invoked by plaintiffs will
trigger judicial review. In contrast to the Data Processing decision
where new terms and concepts were generated without definition, the
Warth opinion stated explicitly what a showing of substantialprobability
entailed. Petitioners must allege that (1) they held "a present interest
in any Penfield property," (2) they were "subject to the ordinance's
strictures," and (3) they had been "denied a variance or permit by respondent officials."52 Since no low-income minority plaintiff successfully excluded from Penfield could satisfy any of these requirements
the possibility of any direct attack on exclusionary zoning ordinances is
foreclosed. The only persons who can satisfy these three criteria, other
than the residents of Penfield53 are developers; any future challenge
must therefore be brought as a third party suit by minority plaintiffs
on behalf of a developer. Even this avenue of attack, which has been
used successfully in the lower federal courts, was narrowed by the
Warth decision.
C. The Third Party Standing of Minority Plaintiffs

After concluding that the individual petitioners did not have standing in their own right, the Court presumed that they were in fact bringing a third party action on behalf of the developers who were denied
a variance by the Penfield Zoning Board.54 Originally intended to supply a causal link between respondents' actions and plaintiffs' injury, the
allegations relating to two unsuccessful applications for rezoning filed
by developers were examined in the context of a third party suit.
In late 1969, Penfield Better Homes Corporation attempted to obtain a variance to rezone certain land to allow construction of subsidized
cooperative housing units that could be purchased by persons of moderate income. The Penfield Planning Board denied the variance on
the grounds that it would (1) constitute an inappropriate use of the
land and would not be consonant with the existing character of the
neighborhood, (2) cause traffic congestion, and (3) present the danger
52. Id.
53. Those white residents of Penfield who did not wish to perpetuate the exclusionary zoning policy and who sought to challenge the ordinance because it deprived them
of the benefits of living in an integrated community were denied standing by the Warth
Court. See note 13 supra.
54. The Court warned that in such third party suits, it may be substantially more
difficult to satisfy the case or controversy mandate of Article M because the harm
caused by the governmental prohibition or restriction is only indirect. 422 U.S. at 505.
See note 13 supra for a general discussion of the circumstances in which third party suits
are proper.
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of soil erosion during and after construction."s In late 1971, O'Brien
Homes, Inc. made a similar effort to build housing for persons of "low
income and accumulated funds" and persons "of moderate income with

limited funds for down payment."

Once again the request for a vari-

ance was denied.5 6
The Warth Court held plaintiffs' third party standing inadequate.
In the case of third party suits, the substantial probability test again
comes into play, this time requiring that plaintiffs represent the hypothetical family for whom the proposed housing project was designed.

After an elaborate analysis in extensive footnotes, the Court concluded
that none of the plaintiffs represented precisely that family. Petitioners

Ortiz, Broadnax, and Sinkler alleged that they could afford a maximum
of $120 per month for housing. The majority of the Court concluded
that the proposed units were too small to accommodate the large families

of Ortiz and Broadnax and that neither Sinkler nor Broadnax could
afford to live in the proposed units. Petitioner Reyes presented a "special
case" in that her income level would preclude her from living in the
proposed units because they were to be government-subsidized. 5

Thus,

only those cases in which plaintiff has alleged that he has the housing
needs and financial capabilities to reside in one of the proposed units
will be reviewed on the merits.
55. Petitioners' Brief for the United States Supreme Court at 7, Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975). A survey by the County of Monroe, Director of Public Works
revealed that increased traffic would not create any problems with respect to existing
traffic facilities in the area. Id.
56. 422 U.S. at 505 n.15.
57. 422 U.S. at 506-07 n.16. The majority's conclusion is subject to question in
several respects. For example, the calculations of the Court took inflation into account
in computing rental costs of the units, but ignored probable salary increases of the petitioners in computing the amounts that each could afford to spend for housing.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argues that petitioners would have qualified under the proposed project income levels: "Inhere appears in the record as it
stands a report of the Penfield Housing Task Force on Moderate Income Housing ...
prepared for the Penfield Town Board itself, which defines 'moderate income families as
families having incomes between $5,500 and $11,000 per year, depending on the size
of the family,' . . . and moderate-income housing as housing 'priced below $20,000 or
[carrying] a rental price of less than $150 a month' .... Thus, while the Court might
not know what was meant by 'low' and 'moderate' income housing, . . .respondents
clearly did. The petitioners here under discussion fell within the Board's own definition
of moderate-income families, except for petitioner Reyes, who alleges that she could afford a house for $20,000 but not more .... The causation theory which the Court
finds improbable, then, was adopted by the task force of the Town Board itself. Of
course, we do not know at this stage whether a particular named plaintiff would certainly have benefited from the changes recommended by the task force, but at least there
is a good chance that, after discovery and trial, they could show they would." 422 U.S.
at 527-28 n.7.

Spring 19761

WARTH v. SELDIN

D. The Requirement of Proof on the Pleadings
The dissent argued that the Warth plaintiffs did have standing under DataProcessing:
[I]t is abundantly clear that the harm alleged satisfies the "injury in fact, economic or otherwise," [citing Data Processing]
requirement which is prerequisite to standing in federal court.
The harms claimed-consisting of out-of-pocket losses as well as
denial of specifically enumerated services available in Penfield
but not in these petitioners' present communities . . . are obviously more palpable and concrete than those held sufficient to8
sustain standing in other cases. [Citing SCRAP and Sierra Club.]
Until Warth a mere allegation of a causal link was sufficient. The
first prong of the Data Processing standing test required that a plaintiff
allege a causal connection between the alleged injury in fact and defendants' action. SCRAP exemplified the Court's willingness to accept
a complaint alleging a most attenuated chain of causation, at least for
the issue of standing. 9 As stressed by Justice Brennan, the new test set
out in Warth exhibits, in contrast, the Court's unwillingness to find that
the requirement of causation can be satisfied by anything less than proof
on the pleadings."0
The newly created "substantial probability" test undermines the
policy decision made in Data Processing by reducing access to the federal courts and compelling threshold examination of the merits. The
Court may have wished to qualify the causal element in standing cases
to preclude the use of a standard as lax as that employed in SCRAP,
which might be characterized as requiring only a remote possibility of
injury. Still, the Court could have accomplished this result without
subverting the policy underlying the Data Processing decision. A demand of "reasonable probability" would have assured that the pleadings "be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable,"'" yet would not have forced the plaintiff to prove his case
at the standing stage.
E. The Problem of an Adequate Remedy
Underlying the causation standard announced in Warth is the
Court's concern that an adequate remedy be provided in all cases.
Thus, the ultimate question is not whether the defendants harmed
plaintiffs in a specific way, but whether the Court feels that it can pro58. Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

59. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
60. This is noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent. 422 U.S. at 528.

61. U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688.
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The Court's reliance on Linda R. v. Richard D. 62

illustrates this concern:
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that . . . if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed. 3

In this opinion, a mother of an illegitimate child challenged the
allegedly discriminatory application of a Texas criminal statute 4 providing that any "parent" who failed to support his or her children was

subject to prosecution.

This statute had been consistently construed

by the Texas courts to apply solely to parents of legitimate children.
Although the Court acknowledged that the mother had suffered an

injury, the majority, in a five to four decision, nevertheless denied
her standing because she was unable to show that the father's failure
to support his illegitimate child was a result of the nonenforcement
of the criminal statute.

The Court reasoned that enforcement of the

statute would send the father to jail but would in no way insure that

the plaintiffs child would receive any support. 65 According to the
Court, the proper party to challenge the underinclusiveness of the stat-

ute66 would be the parent of a legitimate child who had been prosecuted for failure to support his child.

Similarly, the minority plaintiffs in Warth were denied access to
the Court because they had not established a substantial probability that
they would be able to purchase or lease homes in the township if the
Penfield ordinance were struck down. The court in Warth cited Linda
R.S. as support for its new causation test. But in Linda R.S. the standard of causation was appreciably lower than "substantial probability":

"[A] plaintiff must show a 'logical nexus between the status asserted and
62. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
63. 422 U.S. at 504.
64. Tex. Acts 1913, at 188; 1929, ch. 195, § 1, at 427; 1931, ch. 276, § 1, at 479
(repealed 1973) (now Tex. Penal Code § 25.05).
65. The majority's rationale in Linda R.S. is subject to question. As pointed out by
Justice White in his dissent: "The Court states that the actual coercive effect of those
sanctions on Richard D. or others 'can, at best, be termed only speculative.' This is
a very odd statement. I had always thought our civilization had assumed that the threat
of penal sanctions had something more than a 'speculative' effect on a person's conduct.
•... Certainly Texas does not share the Court's surprisingly novel view. It assumes
that criminal sanctions are useful in coercing fathers to fulfill their support obligations
to their legitimate children." 410 U.S. at 621 (White, J.,
dissenting).
66. For a discussion of underinclusiveness, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341, 348-51 (1949). There, the authors define an underinclusive classification as follows: "All who are included in the class are
tainted with the mischief, but there are others also tainted whom the classification does
not include. Since the classification does not include all who are similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law, there is a prima facie violation of the equal protection
requirement of reasonable classification." Id. at 348.
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the claim sought to be adjudicated . .. ".
"' In view of the Warth
decision, low income minorities who wish to challenge zoning ordinances as exclusionary will be presented with two alternatives. The first
is to incur the expense involved in perfecting an actual housing start and
filing an application with the zoning board. If this is not a viable alternative, as it generally will not be, they will be forced to rely on developers who may have different and even conflicting motives and goals
in challenging a local zoning ordinance. Land developers are unlikely
spokesmen for persons excluded from the suburbs, in view of the fact
that they share the same fears as suburbanites who adopt exclusionary
ordinances-that land values will drop if low and moderate cost housing
is built in the area where their land investment is made. 8
F. Alternative Precedents
The outcome in Warth was not preordained. In the past few
years severl federal district and circuit courts have granted standing
to low-income minority plaintiffs who joined with developers to challenge the exclusionary policies of a particular community. 69 Typical
of these cases is Kennedy Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna.70 Lackawanna, New York, had a total population of approximately 30,000. The city was divided into three wards, with a series
of railroad tracks separating the first ward from the second and third.
Most of the heavy industry in the city was located in the first ward
where the Bethlehem Steel Corporation alone occupied more than half
of the land. "Health-wise it is classified as a 'high risk area,' having
double the incidence of tuberculosis and the highest infant mortality
rate of the entire city."'' r In this highly industrialized first ward, which
contained the most dilapidated housing
in Lackawanna, lived 98.9 per72
cent of the city's nonwhite population.
In 1968, the Colored People's Civic and Political Organization, a
group of citizens concerned about the housing situation in the first
ward, obtained a commitment from the Catholic Diocese of Buffalo to
sell them approximately thirty acres of land in the third ward. The organization planned to build low-income housing on this land. The pro67. 410 U.S. 614, 618. Had this standard been applied in Warth, the plaintiffs'
allegations would have sufficed. Certainly, a showing of "logical nexus" would not have
demanded the extensive inquiry into each petitioner's precise financial status that was required by the "substantial probability" test.
68. Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents,
23 STAN. L. REv. 774, 782 (1971).
69. See note 8 supra.
70. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
71. 436 F.2d at 110.
72. Id.
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posed sale was greeted with an "enthusiastic" response by the prospective third ward members. Immediately petitions were circulated opposing the sale. The many signatories included such illustrious members of the community as the incumbent mayor and the president of
the city council. In October, 1968, the city council passed an ordinance designating the land, previously proposed as a subdivision, as a
park and recreation area and announced an indefinite moratorium on
new subdivisions due to sewer problems. Shortly thereafter, a group
of low-income residents and several developers brought suit in federal
court to rescind both the rezoning and the moratorium. The court, in
granting plaintiffs relief, summarily concluded that "all Plaintiffs [including minority individuals] have a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy. 73 In reaching this conclusion, the court did not condition the standing of the minority plaintiffs upon that of the developer.
Insofar as the court in Kennedy Park reached an innovative result
by granting standing to persons who had no property interest in the traditional sense, it should have carefully explained its holding. The fact
that the court did not do so enabled the Supreme Court in Warth to
make short shrift of this holding. The Court distinguished cases like
Kennedy Park from Warth on three grounds: (1) the plaintiffs challenged rezoning restrictions preventing development of particular projects; (2) the projects would have supplied housing within plaintiffs'
means; and (3) the plaintiffs intended to reside in the projects.'
But even though lower court cases such as Kennedy Park were more
specifically oriented to particular projects, the policy and scope of Data
Processing certainly did not preclude an extension of these cases to
encompass the Warth litigants. 73 The Court in Warth indicated that
at least when the discriminatory motive is blatant the Court will not
tolerate municipalities' exclusionary practices. The Court also acknowledged the possibility that its test for standing may be relaxed in certain
circumstances:
This is not to say that the plaintiff who challenges a zoning ordinance or zoning practices must have a present contractual interest
in a particular project. A particularized personal interest may be
shown in various ways, which we need not undertake to identify
in the abstract. But usually the initial focus should be on a particular project."
The unidentified circumstances would presumably involve a situation
in which the discriminatory motive is so apparent as to obviate the problem of causation.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 112.
422 U.S. at 507.
Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 508 n.18.
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III. Possible Explanations for the Result in Warth
A. A Decision on the Merits
The suggestion is often made that standing decisions are inevitably
tainted to some degree by the court's attitude toward the merits of the
case. 7 Clearly, the outraged dissenters in Warth felt that the majority
opinion rested, in reality, upon the merits. Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent, suggested that the majority lacked sympathy for the petitioners' case:
With all respect, I think that the Court reads the complaint and
the record with antagonistic eyes. There are in the background of
this case continuing strong tides of opinion touching on very sensitive matters, some
78 of which involve race, some class distinctions
based on wealth.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, perceived an
aversion on the part of the Court to confront the numerous and extremely complicated questions posed by this case:
I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to adjudicate the complex
and difficult legal questions involved in determining the constitutionality of practices which assertedly limit residence in a particular
municipality to those who are white and relatively well off, and I
also understand that the merits of this case could involve grave sociological and political ramifications. But courts cannot refuse to
hear a case on the merits merely because they would prefer not
to. ...

79

In light of these remarks, it seems appropriate to discuss the merits and
to attempt to determine what it was that the majority may have felt was
better left undecided.
Traditionally, in the area of equal protection, the Court applies a
test of minimum rationality8" to state action that raises socio-economic
77. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 18, at 480-81. "[lit is difficult to believe that a
judge deciding whether to hear a constitutional or administrative challenge always draws
fine distinctions between these components [of justiciability, including, among others,
standing, ripeness, mootness]. It is perhaps more reasonable to conclude that frequently the judge takes more of a 'Gestalt approach,' and that his real concern is simply
whether he should hear the case on the merits. This may explain why courts strain
to find standing and to navigate the other hurdles to judicial review in some cases but
not in others. Furthermore, it is difficult to ignore the merits of the case, particularly
when the denial of standing may be an effective denial of the underlying claim itself."
Id. See also Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L.
R v. 433 (1962).
78. 422 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
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issues. The application of this standard generally determines the out-

come of the action, because some rational basis, real or hypothetical,

can always be found to justify the allegedly discriminatory action. 8 '

Where a suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved, however, the Court employs a more demanding standard. The state must
show that the classification or the infringement of such a right is neces-

sary to further a compelling state interest and that no less onerous alternative is available. Again, the application of this strict scrutiny standard generally determines the outcome of the case because the burden
is virtually impossible for the defendant to sustain. 2 As a result, a

plaintiff challenging exclusionary ordinances seeks to trigger this higher
standard of review.

Ordinances involving wealth and racial classifica-

tions and infringements on the right to travel would appear to present
a strong case for applying the compelling state interest test.
1. Wealth
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez8 3 dispelled

any prospect that classifications based on wealth were per se suspect
classifications. Prior to Rodriguez, several cases seemed to indicate
that the Court was contemplating a campaign for economic equalization.

4

In Rodriguez, however, without overruling a single prece-

Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972);
Forum: Equal Protectionand the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 645 (1975). A
most intriguing development in the Burger Court is the sporadic indication that traditional "mere rationality" review may mean, for the first time in many years, more than
a perfunctory sanction of challenged state action. In several decisions during the 197172 Term the Court, while ostensibly employing the rational basis standard, struck down
the challenged legislation. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
81. Only one Supreme Court decision in recent decades has held socio-economic
legislation violative of equal protection. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), rev'd
per curiam, City of New Orleans v. Duke, 44 U.S.L.W. 5075 (U.S. June 25, 1976).
82. In only one case has the state ever sustained the burden of demonstrating a
compelling state interest. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
83. 411 U.9. 1 (1973).
84. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). Professor
Michelman went so far as to attempt to develop a theoretical framework within which
elaboration of a governmental "duty to protect against certain hazards which are endemic in an unequal society" can take place. Id. at 9. Michelman recognizes the undesirability of complete economic equality and would require only minimum protection for
the poor. In his view, poverty is a "complex of absolute, not relative, deprivationsa syndrome of particularly poignant hardships and particularly crushing denials of opportunity." Id. at 8. Under this theory, "[ihe claimant does not, except in a quite
limited sense, try to show that an overall distributional configuration is improper. He
claims a right to have a specific, existing want provided for, rather than to have a gen-
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dent,8 5 Justice Powell reduced the significance of wealth classifications
to a single application. Two factors must coexist: (1) the plaintiff's
income must fall below some identifiable level of poverty, or he must
be indigent; and (2) he must have been absolutely deprived of a desired benefit.8

6

The high water mark in what many saw as the pre-Rodriguez current toward defining wealth classification as suspect was Shapiro v.
erally larger or more equal income." Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original). A "just
want" is identifiable by two distinctive characteristics: (1) it is one that "justice requires that everyone be enabled to satisfy," and (2) it is one "everyone presumably
would choose to satisfy" if he had the means, Id. at 30. To allow such want to go
unsatisfied involuntarily is an injustice resultant from lack of wealth, because had the
person had access to the means, he would have satisfied the want. "[Jlustice requires
more than a fair opportunity to realize an income which can cover these needs or insure
against them-requires, to be sure, absolute assurance that they will be met when and
as felt, free of any remote contingencies pertaining to effort, thrift, or foresight." Id.
at 14.
85. A line of criminal cases, beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
appeared to be indicia of a possible willingness on the part of the Court to undo other
inequalities resulting from disparate economic conditions. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963). These were approved by Justice Powell because each had involved a constitutional right in which an indigent was completely deprived by reason of his poverty.
Justice Powell notes in Rodriguez that the Court in Douglasprovided no relief for those
on whom the burden of paying for a criminal defense is relatively great but not insurmountable. Nor did the Court there deal with the relative differences in quality of
counsel employed. 411 U.S. at 21. The Court in Rodriguez discussed only one in the
series of voting rights cases, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). In Bullock, the
Court invalidated a Texas filing fee requirement for primary elections. Like the criminal cases, Bullock was approved because in that case inability to pay caused absolute
denial of a place on the primary ballot, and no other reasonable means of access was
provided by the state.
Justice Powell's failure to discuss Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966), is understandable because, despite the fact that the case has been cited as
a wealth classification case, it really is not. True, the case contained some enigmatic
language to the effect that the poll tax drew a line based on wealth, that such lines are
"traditionally disfavored," and that wealth is "not germane to one's ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process." Id. at 668. But the decision strikes down the
poll tax completely as applied to all persons, not just the poor.
86. 411 U.S. at 22-25. The Court indicates that "benefits" will be limited to important constitutional rights. Evidently, these rights when coupled with wealth in the
appropriate circumstance need not be of that special breed of right, the "fundamental"
right, since Justice Powell indicates in a footnote that the right to a basic education
coupled with wealth discrimination might well suffice to require that strict scrutiny be
applied. Id. at 25 n.60. "An educational financing system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be considerably
closer. If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State only
to those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people . . . who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an
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Thompson, 7 in which the Court applied the strict scrutiny test to strike
down welfare residency requirements.

Surprisingly, the Rodriguez

majority had no difficulty reconciling Shapiro with its conclusion that
wealth is not a suspect classification. The Court simply concluded that
the Shapiro decision was based, not upon wealth discrimination, but upon an interference with a fundamental right-the right to travel."" It
was the penalty attendant upon the exercise of this fundamental right
that compelled the application of the strict scrutiny test. Thus, the perception of Shapiro and other cases as the heralds of a constitutional assault upon economic inequity was nothing more than a case of mistaken
identity.""
Although the Warth plaintiffs were excluded because of their inability to afford the type of home allowed under the Penfield ordinance,
this wealth classification was not the kind constitutionally impermissible
under Rodriguez. While it might be argued that the plaintiffs' incomes
fell below a particular poverty level, they were not absolutely deprived
of a "desired benefit" as they could afford housing in a community
other than Penfield.
2. Right to Travel
In view of the Court's position in Rodriguez that "[ilt is not the
province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the
name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws,"9 0 commentators
have suggested the enlistment of an existing constitutional doctrine, the

fundamental right to travel, to combat exclusionary land use practices. 91
Although an attractive proposition, this approach is fraught with many
problems.
education. That case would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us today." Id.
87. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
88. 411 U.S. at 31-32. Shapiro is not discussed at all in the portion of the opinion
dealing with wealth.
89. Interestingly, in Rodriguez, Justice Powell's discussion of wealth classification never mentibns the fact that the Rodriguez decision is another milestone in the
Court's retreat from at-large intervention in the name of economic equality, a direction
in which the Court had already taken steps in such cases as Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972), James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), and Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). Justice Powell apparently refuses to acknowledge any trend from
which retreat could be made, and he treats these cases as concerned with nonfundamental rights, not with wealth classifications.
90. 411 U.S. at 33.
91. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Travel-Phased Development
Plan Unconstitutionally Burdens the Right to Travel of Persons Excluded, 28 VANn. L.
REV. 430 (1975); Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for
Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972).
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The uncertainty surrounding the Shapiro brand of right to travel
raises doubts about whether it can appropriately be applied to exclusionary zoning that prevents people from moving from inner-city to suburb. The Supreme Court has not extended the right to travel to intrastate travel, and it is unclear whether the Court will ever do so. Possibly the lack of precedent is more the result of the interstate nature
of the factual situations brought before the Court than a conscious limiting of the scope of the doctrine.12 Several lower court opinions since
Shapiro have shown no conceptual difficulty in extending the right to
include intrastate travel: 93
[Tihere appears to be no valid distinction between interstate and
intrastate travel. . . . The right to travel does not depend on the
interstate nature of the travel. Although only interstate travel weas
involved in Shapiro, the Court ascribed the right to travel to the
Constitution generally, not specifically to the Commerce Clause.
. . To the extent that the right to travel derives from "our constitutional concepts of personal liberty," . . . it is not dependent
on the crossing94 of state lines, but encompasses movement within
a state as well.
Another stumbling block in applying the right to travel doctrine
to exclusionary zoning cases is that the Shapiro penalty analysis demands that the interference with the right must amount to a penalty
before intensive review is applied. In Shapiro a statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to residents of less than one year was found
to constitute a penalty to those exercising their constitutional right to
travel. The Court found that the purpose of the statute, the deterrence
of in-migration, was not constitutionally permissible, and therefore
would not justify the statutory prohibition under either standard of review. The professed purpose of preserving fiscal integrity was not a
compelling state interest. Shapiro suggested two criteria in determin*

92. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the Supreme
Court refused to extend the right to travel to intrastate travel because this was not necessary for the resolution of the case. Id. at 255-56. The Court denied certiorari in King
v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971), a case extending the right to travel to intrastate travel.
The Court has indicated, however, that it considers the right to travel to be a personal
right and that such rights transcend state boundaries. 'This Court long ago recognized
that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth
of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 629 (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574
(N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz.
1971); Cole v. Housing Authority of Newport, 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I. 1970).
94. King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F. Supp. 427, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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ing what standard of review should be used in a,given case: (1)
whether the alleged interference deters migration and (2) whether the
state action penalizes the exercise of the right to travel.9"
In Memorial Hospitalv. MaricopaCounty,98 decided five years after Shapiro, Justice Marshall reduced the criteria to a single element.
Actual deterrence of travel need not be shown; instead, the penalty
characterization is the critical consideration.
Justice Marshall added
to the learning of Shapiro, stating that whether a residency requirement
is a penalty depends upon the nature of the benefits affected.
In
Shapiro, the Court found the denial of the basic necessities of life to
be a "penalty". On the facts in Maricopa,Justice Marshall observed:
Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis,
it is at least clear that medical care is as much "a basic necessity
of life" to an indigent as welfare assistance. 99
Only one district court case, Construction Industry Association of
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma,10 0 has dealt with the Shapiro brand
of right to travel in the context of local land use restrictions. That decision struck down an ordinance designed to restrict Petaluma's growth
on the ground that it violated the constitutional right to travel:
Inasmuch as there is no meaningful distinction between a law
which "penalizes" the exercise of a right and one which denies it
altogether, it is clear that the growth limitation under attack may
be 10
defended only insofar as it furthers a compelling state interest. 1
However, this holding is of dubious value as precedent because
the case was reversed on other grounds,1 02 and the district court's analysis was so scant as to be of little value to subsequent litigants. The
final disposition of the Petaluma case leaves one question unanswered:
95. 394 U.S. at 629-31.
96. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
97. Id. at 257-58.
98. "And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have
often been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less essential forms
of governmental entitlements." Id. at 259.
99. Id.
100. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
101. Id. at 582.
102. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). On appeal, the circuit court, relying on Warth
v. Seldin, denied standing to the Construction Industry Association on the grounds that
it was not threatened by personal injury within the zone of interest protected by the
constitutional right to travel. The association was, in effect, bringing this cause of action on behalf of "a group of unknown third parties allegedly excluded from Petaluma,"
id. at 904, and this suit did not qualify for any of the exceptions to the general rule
barring third party suits. See note 13 supra. The circuit court's treatment of the right
to travel challenge suggests that had the "unknown third parties" alleged, on their own
behalf, a violation of their right to travel, they would have been granted standing.
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Is denial of an opportunity to reside in a particular locality an infringement upon the right to travel within the meaning of Shapiro?

Such a denial seems to be a greater infringement upon the right than
a denial of welfare benefits to recent immigrants since it constitutes a
total restriction. The Supreme Court, however, may find that unlike
food, shelter and medical care for an indigent, a residence in Penfield,

New York for a low-income family cannot be characterized as a "necessity of life," especially in view of the Court's express holding in Lindsey
v. Normet'0 a that the right to decent housing is not a fundamental right.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas4'4 also presents a formidable obstacle to any attempt to compel strict scrutiny in land use cases. The
ordinance there in question restricted land use in the town to single
family dwellings. The definition of family was limited to no more than
two unrelated persons. Petitioners argued that this statute interfered
with their right to travel, right to freedom of association, and right to
privacy. Justice Douglas' response, accompanied by a string of citations, was a conclusory statement to the effect that no fundamental
rights were involved.10 5 Having found no suspect classification or fundamental right, the Court required merely that the ordinance be rationally related to a legitimate purpose and that the rational basis test be

met:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed
to family needs.10 6

Belle Terre indicates that in any attack on exclusionary land use ordinances via the right to travel, 0the
Court may defer to the right of self7
determination of communities.1
103. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In this case the Supreme Court definitively denied that
there is a fundamental right to decent housing: "We do not denigrate the importance
of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.... Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing . . . [is a] legislative, not
judicial, function." Id. at 74.
104. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
105. Id. at 7-8.
106. Id. at 9. Justice Douglas uses similar language in his Warth dissent in support
of his argument that Metro-Act and Housing Council have standing to attack the Penfield ordinance insofar as they represent the communal feeling of the actual residents
of the township. "A clean, safe, and well-heated home is not enough for some people.
Some want to live where the neighbors are congenial and have social and political outlooks similar to their own. This problem of sharing areas of the community is akin to
that when one wants to control the kind of person who shares his own abode." 422
U.S. at 518.
107. The Supreme Court has been out of the land use field for several decades.
This is evident from the dates of the five land use decisions cited by the Court, all of

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

3.

[Vol. 3

Race

Any invidious racial classification automatically invokes strict scrutiny.'
Where the statute is discriminatory on its face' 0 9 or has been
unequally applied to the disadvantage of minorities, 110 invidious discrimination is easily identified. A more difficult case arises when neither of these factors is present and plaintiffs claim of discrimination is
based solely upon allegations of defendant's intent.
Although the Warth plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as "racially discriminatory," neither the face of the ordinance nor its overall
administration evidenced any unequal or arbitrary application against
minorities. On the facts alleged, the plaintiffs could only have invoked
strict scrutiny of the ordinance by claiming that a nonexplicit race
classification was inherent in the explicit wealth classification created
by the ordinance. This challenge would have to be founded upon a
basic syllogism that persons of low income are excluded by the Penfield
ordinance, that a disproportionate number of such persons are minorities and that thus a disproportionate number of minorities are excluded
from the community. Were the Court to accept this reasoning, in the
absence of a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of defendants,
it would have to go one step further and employ an "impact test." Under such a test, a statute fair on its face and fairly administered, which
is unaccompanied by any evidence of discriminatory intent, would be
struck down simply because it had a disproportionately adverse effect
on minorities.
The impact test has been employed by the legislature in the very
limited area of employment testing under Title VII' 1' The language
of Title VII is specific and has not been given an extended reading by
the federal courts."' In areas outside of employment testing the Suwhich predate 1929, except Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, decided in 1954. The Supreme Court is sorely aware of its lack of expertise in this area. As the dissenting Justice Marshall suggested in Belle Terre, the Court's deference is very close to "abdication." 416 U.S. at 14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
109. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
110. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
111. The standards developed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
for employment testing covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1974) (EEOC guidelines), preclude the use of testing
procedures which disproportionately exclude protected minorities, regardless of intent unless they are a demonstrably reasonable measure of job performance and persons acting
upon the results can demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer, or promotion
procedures are unavailable.
112. The only judicial expansion of Title VII has been in the narrow context of
employment tests administered by governmental entities such as police and fire depart-
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preme Court has never acknowledged the impact analysis as a viable
tool, and in fact has, on two occasions, refused to recognize its efficacy.

Both Jefferson v. Hackney 1n and James v. Valtierra"4 stand for the
proposition that an otherwise legitimate classification is not constitu-

tionally "suspect" simply because a greater number of a racial minority
fall into the group disadvantaged by the classification.
In Jefferson, the Court brushed aside the "naked statistical argument" that it was unconstitutional to fund an Aid to Families with De-

pendent Children (AFDC) program at a lower percentage of recognized need than other categories of assistance because of the higher
percentage of minority recipients in the AFDC category.
The basic outlines of eligibility for the various categorical
grants are established by Congress, not by the States; given
the heterogeneity of the Nation's population, it would be only
an infrequent coincidence that the racial composition of each
grant class was identical to that of the others. The acceptance of appellants' constitutional theory would render suspect
each difference in treatment among the grant classes, howand however otherwise raever lacking in racial motivation
tional the treatment might be.' 15
ments. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Walston v.
County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Chesterfield County
School Dist., 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir.
1972); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), modifying 452 F.2d 327 (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972). Though this is significant because Title VII, as originally enacted, provided
a specific exemption from the act's requirements for governmental units, it is not an example of judicial intervention as the exemption was deleted prior to any of these decisions, disclosing to the courts a congressional intent to extend the act.
In Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), appellants argued that the court
should not view the Georgia bar exam, which is failed by a disproportionate number
of black applicants, as within the framework of traditional equal protection analysis, but
should instead apply by analogy the standards developed by the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) covered by Title VII. Appellants contended that Title VII and the
Fourteenth Amendment should be equated. The circuit court in rejecting this argument
relied, inter alia, upon Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). At. issue in Geduldig
was the constitutionality of the California Unemployment Compensation Disability
Fund, which excluded from coverage disabilities associated with normal pregnancy. The
Court found no violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
What the court in Tyler found significant in the Geduldig opinion, however, was the
Court's failure to mention that there existed an EEOC regulation promulgated pursuant
to Title VII which demanded that any temporary disability plan cover disability due to
normal pregnancy. This the circuit court interpreted as a refusal on the part of the Supreme Court to equate the Fourteenth Amendment with Title VII.
113. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
114. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Justice Douglas took no part in the decision. Justice
Marshall's dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined, was based upon the
argument that a classification based on poverty is suspect and demands exacting judicial
scrutiny.
115. 406 U.S. at 548.
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The James case concerned the constitutionality of a California
constitutional provision, Article XXXIV, which requires approval by
referendum for low-rent housing projects. The appellants attempted
to bring their attack on the referendum requirement within the ambit
of Hunter v. Erickson,"'6 in which the Court struck down a city charter
amendment on the ground that the amendment created an impermissible
classification based on race. In Hunter, the citizens of Akron, Ohio had
amended the city charter to require that any ordinance regulating real
estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could not
take effect without approval of a majority of those voting in a city election. The Court held that the amendment created a classification
based on race because it allowed laws dealing with racial housing matters to take effect only if they survived a mandatory referendum while
other housing ordinances took effect immediately. The Court in James
distinguished Hunter.
Unlike the Akron referendum provision, it cannot be said
that California's Article XXXIV rests on "distinctions based
on race" . . . . The Article requires referendum approval for
any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority." 7
The Court was obviously fearful of where the impact test might ultimately lead:
The present case could be affirmed only by extending
Hunter, and this we decline to do . . . . [P]resumably a
state would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were required on all, because they
would always disadvantage some group. And this Court
would be required to analyze governmental structures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster
rule is likely to "disadvantage" any of the diverse and shifting
groups that make up the American people."18
The juxtaposition of Hunter and James demonstrates the contrast between the traditional equal protection analysis and the impact test,
as
19
well as the bounds beyond which the Court has refused to go."
116. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
117. 402 U.S. at 141.
118. Id. at 141-42.
119. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Washington v. Davis, 44 U.S.L.W.
4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976), makes it clear that the Court does not intend to extend the
standard applicable under Title VII to the constitutional standard for adjudicating
claims of invidious racial discrimination. In Davis, the validity of a qualifying test
administered to applicants for positions as police officers in the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department was challenged. Plaintiffs, two unsuccessful applicants, alleged that the test bore no relationship to job performance and had a highly
discriminatory impact in screening out black candidates. In rejecting their contention,
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The Warth plaintiffs' allegation that defendants' administration of
the ordinance was racially discriminatory could be construed as an attack
on the defendants' intent. An inquiry into intent would avoid the problems inherent in the impact test. However, plaintiffs did not support
this bald allegation with sufficient facts to show a continuing discriminatory pattern of administration by defendants and thus foreclosed a finding by the Court of invidious intent on the part of the defendants.
B. The Concept of Prudential Limitations

The above analysis supports a conclusion that, on the basis of existing case law, the Court could have dismissed Warth on the merits.
The Court declined this option and instead articulated a new causation
test that will significantly curtail access to the Court. This latter choice
dovetails with the concept of prudential limitations. This concept emphasizes division of powers as opposed to intra-governmental checks
and balances. Justice Powell, a major proponent of the concept, prefaced the Warth opinion with a statement defining the limited role of
the Court in a tripartite system. Citing his concurrence in United
States v. Richardson,120 where he responded to the dissents call for unrestricted taxpayer and citizen standing, he stated:
Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the
[T]he argument that the Court
expansion of judicial power ....
should allow unrestricted taxpayer or citizen standing underestimates the ability of the representative branches of the Federal
Government to respond to the citizen pressure that has been responsible12in1 large measure for the current drift toward expanded
standing.
According to Justice Powell, citizen advocacy should be employed
against the branches of government intended to be responsive to the
public. The federal system strikes a delicate balance which can be upset by an overextension of the Supreme Court's power. Any expansion
of the standing doctrine should therefore be accomplished through congressional mandate. Prudential restraint is crucial if the, Court is to remain the branch of government "least dangerous to the political rights
of the Constitution ... .
the court stated: "[Dlisproportionate impact is not irrelevant," but "[s]tanding alone,
it does not trigger the rule, that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations." Id. at 4793.
120. 418 U.S. 166, 180-97 (1974).
121. Id. at 188-89.
122. Id. at 193 (citing TAE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 483 (H. Lodge ed. 1908) (A.
Hamilton)). It is interesting to note that it was also in the 78th Federalist that Hamilton said: "Mhe judiciary . . . has no influence over either the sword or the purse;
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
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Justice Powell's concept of the role of the Court overlooks those
victims of exclusionary zoning practices who are unable to secure relief
through the normal democratic process, and whose rights can therefore
be vindicated only by judicial intervention. The facts of Kennedy Park
illustrate that persons excluded cannot successfully interject themselves
into a community's political system in order to generate changes responsive to their needs.
Conclusion
There are other possible explanations why the Court did not dismiss Warth on the merits rather than dispensing with the case on standing grounds. One possibility is that the Court still intends, in a stronger
case, to announce an affirmative obligation on the part of suburbs to
zone inclusionarily"2 s to integrate. Another possibility is that the Court
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 483-84 (H. Lodge ed. 1888)
(A. Hamilton).
123. Inclusionary zoning has been defined as a theory that "all parts of a municipality's residential land must be available to all sectors of the population." The theory is
"premised on the belief that public laws cannot be used to create race or income class
zones either by direction of indirection, except upon the finding of a special need by
a particular class." Davidoff & Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary
Land Use Controls, 22 SYRAcusE L. REV. 509, 523 (1971).
Legislation to counter the effects of exclusionary zoning has already been passed
in two states, Massachusetts and New York. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 20 (Supp.
1976) provides that at least 0.3% of the vacant residential land of a community must
be made available for development each year for a period of five years upon application
by eligible nonprofit or limited-profit housing sponsors for zoning changes. The law
creates a special state zoning board of appeals which rules on the propriety of refusals
by local jurisdictions to permit nonprofit or limited-profit sponsors to proceed with development plans. If the commission finds that a local jurisdiction has failed to make
land available under the law, it is empowered to issue a state permit, overriding local
authorities, for the construction to proceed.
New York's Urban Development Corporation was granted the power to override
local zoning and subdivision laws when they conflict with the corporation's findings that
a certain site was appropriate for low or moderate cost housing, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS
§§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
For a thorough discusison of inclusionary land use programs see H. FRANKLIN, D.
FALK, A. LEVIN, IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE
PROGRAMS (1974); Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1432
(1974).
Only the Supreme Court of New Jersey has ruled that every municipality in the
state has to provide its fair share of low and moderate cost housing for the surrounding
region. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 NJ. 151,
336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
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did not reach the merits because it felt that broad-scale regulation of

land use at the local level is within neither its province nor its capabilities." 4 Apart from any considerations of substantive issues, the
authors feel that the Warth case, as an exanmple of public interest suits
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari in Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert.
granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975). This case exemplifies yet again the failure of attorneys
in the area of discrimination in housing to compile a convincing and exhaustive factual
record. It stands as one more confrontation in a series of hopelessly uncoordinated attacks on exclusionary zoning ordinances. See note 124 infra. In this case the petitioners sought the rezoning of property to permit the construction of a 190-unit townhouse
development for low and moderate income persons. The village denied the rezoning on
the grounds that the property was within an exclusively single family dwelling area and
that a grant of the rezoning would violate the integrity of the village's general plan. Petitioners alleged that the denial of the rezoning violated their constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 801 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §
3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83. This contention was sustained by the circuit
court, relying on Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1070 (1974). The court reasoned that as the rejection of the project had a
racially discriminatory effect, it could only be upheld if it were shown that a compelling
public interest necessitated the decision. The contentions of the village that the integrity
of the plan would be violated and that neighborifig property values would be diminished
were not sufficiently compelling interests to justify the racially discriminatory effect.
It is questionable whether the standing hurdle will be overcome in Arlington
Heights in view of the fact that the development of the project by plaintiff corporation
was to be financed pursuant to section 236 of the National Housing Act and all funds
under this statute have been sequestered.
124. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Supreme Court held that approval of so-called metropolitan school desegregation orders involving suburban school
districts adjacent to or near inner-city school districts are beyond the remedial powers
of federal district courts unless the suburban school officials have actually violated the
Constitution. In Milliken, there was no finding of unconstitutional action on the part
of the suburban schools and no demonstration that the violations committed in the operation of the Detroit school system had any significant segregative effects in the suburbs.
The Supreme Court indicated in Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976), that
the rule of Milliken would apply in land use cases but that on the facts of the case,
Milliken could be distinguished. In Gautreaux, Negro tenants in, or applicants for, public housing in Chicago brought separate class actions against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), alleging the CHA had purposely selected public housing sites in Chicago to avoid placement
of Negro families in white neighborhoods, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
and federal statutes passed pursuant thereto. Petitioners also alleged that HUD had assisted in this unconstitutional policy by providing financial assistance and other support
to CHA.
The Court held that a metropolitan area remedy in the Gautreaux case would not
be impermissible as a matter of law and allowed the case to be remanded for additional
findings and further consideration of the issue of metropolitan area relief. Id. at 1550.
"Here, unlike the desegregation remedy found erroneous in Milliken, a judicial order
directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago will not necessarily entail coercion
of uninvolved governmental units, because both CHA and HUD have the authority to
operate outside the Chicago city limits." Id. at 1546. "To foreclose such relief solely
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at their worst, 25 afforded the Court, already adversely predisposed to
such actions, an opportunity to place a gloss on the DataProcessing test
which would dramatically curtail this type of litigation.
because HUD's constitutional violation took place within the city limits of Chicago
would transform Milliken's principled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial authority into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 1547.
125. See N. Williams, 3 AMECAN LA'D PLANNNG LAW, § 66.52, at 152b n.202
(1975). Professor Williams has expressed his dismay over the lack of coordinated strategy by attorneys challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances, in contrast to the brilliant
strategy employed by the NAACP in litigation involving the desegregation of public education. In the public school cases, the most outrageous examples of segregation were
brought first, followed logically by slightly more innovative situations which were only
a short step from settled precedent. In the area of discrimination in housing, the
situation has been completely different. Warth supports this observation of Professor Williams. In light of the strong precedent requiring a property interest in challenges
of local zoning ordinances by nonresident plaintiffs, attorneys in this area should have
proceeded with caution. A logical progression would have been to secure the Supreme
Court's approval of cases such as Kennedy Park where the discriminatory intent was
clear and the corporate plaintiffs in the action did meet the traditional property interest
requirement. Next the attorneys should have brought a case in which the discriminatory
intent was evident although no participant in the suit had a property interest, or a case
in which the discriminatory intent was latent but one of the corporate plaintiffs did have
a property interest. The worst possible case strategically is Warth in which the discriminatory intent was unclear, there was no specific housing project denied, and none of the
plaintiffs was a future resident of the proposed housing. In addition to these strategic
shortcomings, the Warth litigation also falls short of capturing the sympathy of the
Court by failing to create an overwhelming statistical record to confirm that Penfield's
motive was racial discrimination and not one of the many permissible objectives furthered by exclusionary ordinances. Lastly, the Warth litigation challenges the entire ordinance on its face and fifteen years of administration. Such an allegation lacks the
specificity which is usually viewed with favor by the Court.

